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ARISTOTLE ON THE MECHANICS OF THOUGHT: ABSTRACT
Michael V. Wedin 
University of California, Davis
A number of crucial but quite difficult theses shape 
Aristotle's discussion of thought. Even if we put aside the most 
infamous of these. De Anima III.5's distinction between produc­
tive and receptive mind, there remains much that is puzzling. 
Consider: (1) the mind in activity is the same as the object of
thought; (2) thinking is caused by the object of thought; (3) 
thinking is up to us []; (4) the object of thought is somehow in
the soul; (5) thought is of the universal.
It is clear that Aristotle regards these as central to his 
account of thinking. What is not clear is their exact role. 
Indeed, it is unclear whether they can be fit into a single, 
unified account at all. The paper attempts just such an account. 
And it does so, in part, by relating the theses to the notorious 
productive —  receptive mind distinction.
A background assumption of the paper is that in De Anima 
Aristotle takes seriously the notion of levels of explanation. 
Evident in De Anima I.4's early reminder that we should say not 
that the mind thinks but rather that Socrates thinks in virtue of 
his mind, the assumption is featured centrally in his account of 
thought. Roughly, this works as follows. De Anima accepts as fact 
that we are able to exercise a variety of cognitive functions.
The most impressive of these is thought, especially theoretical 
thought. In particular. De Anima aims to say something about how 
persons, more exactly their souls, must be structured or or­
ganized in order to accomplish this. It is not enough to say that 
persons think in virtue of their minds. That will locate but it 
will not explain the requisite mechanisms. On the reading I shall 
propose, all five theses, as well as the distinction between 
productive and receptive mind, concern the cognitive mechanisms 
underlying thinking.
Thus, the so-called productive and receptive minds should 
not be seen as two separate entities. Rather they are parts or 
features of the mind, lower level mechanisms, introduced to 
explain, for example, how from a ready stock of concepts persons 
are able to think autonomously. They are, in short, part of the 
cognitive equipment needed to explain thinking. Likewise 1-5 are 
best seen as figuring in an account of the cognitive mechanisms 
required for thought. Thus, to take an example, (1) is not to be 
explained as a Pre-socratic remnant nor as the result of accept­
ing a misleading analogy between perception and thought. Rather 
it proposes a cognitivist style explanation of the role of inter­
nal states in episodes of thinking, in particular, how mental 
states can represent objects of thought.
Some attention is devoted to clarifying and tracing the 
relation between these theses but most of it is directed at (2). 
In particular, I puzzle out what Aristotle might mean in saying 
that it is by contact [αφή] with the νοητόν that vour is brought
to active thinking. This is especially puzzling in light of the 
fact that (5) appears to require that a system that is par­
ticular, namely the mind of the individual person, is causally 
effected by a universal. This difficulty is resolved by focusing 
on the way a particular system might be capable of representing 
universal propositions and by taking advantage of what so far has 
been seen as a claim incompatible with (5) —  namely. Metaphysics 
XIII.10's claim that the object of active knowing is not univer­
sal but particular. In the course of discussing (2) I suggest a 
way to honor De Anima III.6's apparent interest in thought of 
incomposite objects without committing the account to the objec­
tion that such "non-discursive" thought entails the absurdity 
that one can think an object without thinking anything about it.
